

The landscape of ACH fraud prevention is evolving — and fast. With the 2026 NACHA rule updates, the responsibility for fraud detection no longer rests solely on the receiving end. Instead, financial institutions and intermediaries that originate ACH transactions are being called to the front lines.
If you’re an ODFI, Third-Party Service Provider (TPSP), or Third-Party Sender (TPS), these changes mark a fundamental shift: you must now monitor outbound transactions for fraud before they hit the ACH network.
This blog explains how ODFIs are now expected to act, not just originate — taking an active role in monitoring ACH transactions for fraud before they’re submitted. But NACHA’s 2026 rule changes go beyond ODFIs alone. Third-Party Senders (TPSs) and Third-Party Service Providers (TPSPs) are also being held to a higher standard.
To see how all participants in the origination chain must evolve — and what proactive steps you can take today — explore our NACHA 2026 Educational Hub.
Historically, ODFIs were expected to conduct due diligence on originators — but fraud monitoring was more reactive. TPSs and TPSPs often operated behind the scenes with limited oversight, even when processing millions of ACH transactions.
That changes in 2026.
According to the updated NACHA Fraud Monitoring Rule:
This applies to outbound credits and debits alike — whether you're sending payroll, vendor payments, tax refunds, or bill collections.
Let’s quickly recap the roles these entities play in the ACH ecosystem.
ACH fraud isn’t hypothetical — and NACHA’s updates are aimed squarely at fraud types that originate from inside the origination pipeline.
A vendor’s email is compromised, and the fraudster sends altered banking details to the TPS handling payroll for multiple clients. The TPS processes dozens of fraudulent outbound credits — unknowingly becoming the conduit.
Unit21 flags:
Action: Alert triggered before submission; transactions held for review.
A small business client has its payroll account taken over. The attacker instructs the TPSP to reroute employee paychecks to attacker-controlled accounts.
With Unit21:
Outcome: Fraud is intercepted, and ACH entries are stopped before transmission.
An ODFI onboarded a new originator last month. Suddenly, this customer is sending thousands of ACH debits targeting consumers — a potential bust-out scheme.
Unit21’s Customer Risk Ratings (CRR)
Result: The customer’s activity is flagged before it causes downstream harm.
You don’t need to build a new fraud program from scratch. Unit21’s platform delivers out-of-the-box support for NACHA’s 2026 obligations — with flexibility to scale and segment monitoring across all your origination partners.
Explore Unit21’s NACHA Rule Educational Center or sign up for our upcoming Webinar: Navigating NACHA’s 2026 Operating Rules With Unit21, where we simulate real-world attacks and show how ODFIs, TPSs, and TPSPs can stop them. You can also read 2026 NACHA operating rule FAQs for financial institutions.


Alex Faivusovich is a fraud prevention leader fighting financial fraud for the past 16 years. His career started in Israel at Leumi Card (MAX), culminating in him leading a team of 15 fraud analysts. In the U.S., Alex joined Matrix-IFS as a senior fraud consultant, providing expertise for Tier -1 banks and Fintech programs.
Alex later served as the Head of Fraud Risk at Lili Bank, leading the implementation of fraud prevention technology within the company and owning the risk policy for first—and third-party fraud. Today, Alex is Head of Fraud Risk at Unit21, guiding and advising clients along their fraud prevention journey.